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The Machine Starts: Computers as Collaborators in 
Writing 
 
While I was preparing this paper, the 11-year-old I live with asked me what I was 
doing, and I told him I was preparing a presentation about how great machines 
are at telling stories. "How can machines tell stories?" he asked incredulously. I 
realised that should have been my title! I originally chose to reference E. M 
Forster's short story, 'The Machine Stops' in my title because I think it is 
necessary to invoke at once the dystopian vision that the idea of storytelling 
machines conjures. The idea of sentient machines - which surely they must be to 
compose tales - is popularly horrific, alienating, and dangerous. Intelligent 
machines always turn out to be evil. Often popular adaptations of this trope 
present clear lines between human and nonhuman 'intelligences', thereby 
permitting a war between them in which the happy outcome is the one in which 
the unfeeling machines are vanquished. 
 
Forster's story is dystopian and has the contours of such an ethical boundary, but 
is more subtle, exploring the way in which the humans who inhabit the machine 
world are shaped by its demands and imperatives. A transgressing wanderer 
reaches close to the surface of the subterranean world of the machines, and later 
reports: 
 
"There was a ladder, made of some primӕval metal. The light from the railway fell 
upon its lowest rungs, and I saw that it led straight upwards out of the rubble at 
the bottom of the shaft. Perhaps our ancestors ran up and down it a dozen times 
daily, in their building. As I climbed, the rough edges cut through my gloves so 
that my hands bled. The light helped me for a little, and then came darkness and, 
worse still, silence which pierced my ears like a sword. The Machine hums! Did 
you know that? Its hum penetrates our blood, and may even guide our thoughts. 
Who knows! I was getting beyond its power. Then I thought: "This silence means 
that I am doing wrong." But I heard voices in the silence, and again they 
strengthened me." He laughed. "I had need of them. The next moment I cracked 
my head against something." (Forster, 1909) 
 
I love the idea that the all-pervasive rumble of the machine is so constitutive of 
life that it withdraws from consciousness even as it guides our thoughts, and I'm 
going to return to the idea that how we think is shaped by the machines we live 
with. First though, I'm going to quickly talk about some work I've been doing with 
the digital writer, Tim Wright. In a project called 'Hauntology', we've been 
exploring how we can create interactive and participatory narratives using a 
combination of poetry, software, antique objects and digital sensors and circuits - 
and increasingly now - walking. In one piece, a chest of drawers was 'haunted' by 
the spirits of its previous owners. A user could access snippets of their lives by 
interacting with the chest of drawers and objects on and in it, as well as 
eventually 'haunting' it themselves with the sounds they left behind for the next 
users to hear. 
 
We're currently exploring how we can use an old wooden box, wired up with an 
audio device and some sensors, to act as the focal device for a walking, talking, 
poetic experience based on the poetry of Thomas Hardy and the geography of 
the outskirts of Dorchester. In this we are trying to compose a narrative 
experience which is absorbing, authentic, haunting and provocative - out of 
antique bric-a-brac, digital sensors and media, physical space, sounds, smells, 
scenes, embodied and interpersonal interactions, and both reading and writing 
poetry. To this end I've been experimenting with wiring electronic devices into old 
wooden boxes. 
 
One of the things I've noticed about the process is the feeling that the electronic 
systems and circuits, and the antique wooden boxes and drawers, are all 
exerting their own influence on the proceedings. They only allow certain sorts of 
behaviours and affordances to get the go-ahead. At first I thought this is an 
artefact of my own imprecision and inexperience. The further I get, though, the 
more I'm sure that the objects I work with have intentions of their own. Just as a 
sculptor seeks to find the form already within the matter at hand, as if discovering 
the spirit in the material, so I am collaborating with the devices I coerce and 
adapt to perform as they want to, as though I am obeying a ghost in their 
machine. 
 
I'm now afraid that I'm sounding crazy, so I want to run through a quick and very 
partial history of writers collaborating with devices, to see if I'm alone in my 
craziness. I'm thinking here about the production of textual artefacts through the 
action of some sort of device - something I'm therefore going to call a device-
oriented narrative - produced by some sort of rule or algorithm or heuristic 
process. I think this is a fairly good, low-level definition of a 'writing machine' - an 
apparatus or assemblage which performs some sort of function on the raw 
materials of textual production. 
 








Sentences for love forsaken."  
 
(Hartman and Kenner, 1995) 
 
Nick Montfort explains the provenance of this piece of text, taken from a book by 
Hartman and Kenner, "Sentences": 
 
"To write Sentences, Hartman and Kenner took 457 19th-century "Sentences for 
Analysis and Parsing, Thayer Street Grammar School" and providentially 
generated an intermediate text, using Claude Shannon's Markov chain technique 
as implemented in TRAVESTY by Hugh Kenner and Joseph O'Rourke. The 
resulting text was corrected and used as input to Hartman's program DIASTEXT, 
which carried out diastic selection as developed by Jackson Mac Low." (Montfort, 
2008) 
 
I don't want to dwell on the detail of the particular processes that were used to 
produce these texts - just to note that Montfort's description illustrates very 
clearly the notion that a non-trivial operation has been performed to produce the 
work: the raw input is worked on in some way to produce a text at the end. In this 
case at least two sets of iterative actions were performed on the input to produce 
strangely evocative words. This therefore is a machine text. 
 
I want to draw a distinction here from what Espen Aarseth has refered to as a 
'cybertext' - a text which requires work on the part of the reader to traverse it 
(Aarseth, 1997). I want to think of texts which require some act of delegation by 
the writer to a machine to produce them. We could get horribly metaphysical 
about what constitutes mechanism, machinism and what does not. Is a pen a 
machine? A typewriter? While it is tempting to say that in the term 'machine' I 
exclude devices which merely reproduce mechanical extensions of the writer's 
actions, this may become a moot point as we proceed. Katherine Hayles in How 
We Became Posthuman (1999), deals with the difference, for example, between 
a typewriter and a computer by noting the non-linear disruption that occurs when 
dematerialisation is introduced into the machinic action. I want to avoid this 
distinction, as there are perfectly good examples of writerly delegation that can 
occur within entirely material parameters. 
 
I'm going to go with Richard Sennet's understanding of the machine in The 
Craftsman (2008), which I read as an intermediary device between the hand of 
the craftsman and the work itself, which effects some non-trivial transformation. 
This allows me to include devices such as horoscopes and Tarot cards, runes 
and tea-leaves, dice and difference engines, as well as electronic circuits, 
random algorithms, neural networks and artificial intelligences. 
 
As the inclusion of Tarot hints, divination or possession by a deus ex machina 
seems to have a provenance in machine thinking. The 'I-Ching' was not only a 
repository of confucian wisdom, but a device for answering questions. Aarseth 
describes it thus: 
 
"The I Ching is made up of sixty-four symbols, or hexagrams, which are the 
binary combinations of six whole or broken ("changing") lines [...] A hexagram [...] 
contains a main text and six small ones, one for each line. By manipulating three 
coins or forty-nine yarrow stalks according to a randomizing principle, the texts of 
two hexagrams are combined, producing one out of 4,096 possible texts. This 
contains the answer to a question the user has written down in advance (e.g., 
"How much rice should I plant this year?")." (Aarseth, 1997) 
 
From a European, humanist point of view, there is no particularly significant 
difference between a blind algorithm and the pronouncements of oracles and 
fortune-tellers - both are equally meaningless, and in the post-Enlightenment 
mind it is difficult to think otherwise. Educated people are supposed to scorn 
horoscopes and prophecies. Yet this adoption of a rational, materialistic ontology 
doesn't extend to our celebration of the transcendence of human agency and 
intelligence, with which we persevere in cherishing against the blind heuristic 
principle of automatons. 
 
The automative principle of composition is evident in the work of Raymond 
Roussel, such as in Locus Solus (1914). Although after his death he inspired the 
OuLiPo writers and the nouveau roman, during his lifetime, after some initial 
popularity amongst the surrealists, he was largely ridiculed and certainly critically 
panned. His works are very unusual, as can be gleaned from this account of his 
composition technique from John Ashbery: 
 
"Sometimes he would take a phrase containing two words, each of which had a 
double meaning, and use the least likely ones as the nucleus of a story. Thus the 
phrase 'maison á espagnolettes' ("house with window latches") served as the 
basis for an episode in Impressions of Africa about a house (a royal family or 
house) descended from a pair of Spanish twin girls. [...]  
  
"Just as the mechanical task of finding a rhyme sometimes inspires a poet to 
write a great line, [...] "rhymes for events" helped him to utilise his unconscious 
mind. " (Ashbery, 1995 [1962]) 
 
The French surrealist writer Michel Leiris suggested that Roussel is tapping into 
an ancient tradition of eliciting myths from words, seeking out the 'disease of 
language', which is the source of mythology or collective unconscious." (ibid) 
Here, though Leiris is still perhaps seeking to legitimise the text for its inner 
human truth, its interpretation of the human unconscious. The text may be 
unconventionally produced, but its defender still seeks to recuperate it into the 
realm of human desires, motives and meanings, against the criticism that the 
work is a joke of no obvious inherent merit. 
 
Similar recuperations might be made of other device-oriented narratives. In the 
1920s the Dadaist Tristan Tzara, cited by Burroughs and Gysin later as an 
inspiration for their employment of the composition algorithm called 'the cut-up', 
apparently started a riot by pulling a poem out of a hat. In his dada manifesto, his 
wrote: 
 
"TO MAKE A DADAIST POEM 
  
Take a newspaper.  
Take some scissors. 
Choose from this paper an article of the length you want to make your poem.  
Cut out the article.  
Next carefully cut out each of the words that makes up this article and put them 
all in a bag.  
Shake gently.  
Next take out each cutting one after the other.  
Copy conscientiously in the order in which they left the bag. 
The poem will resemble you.  
And there you are - an infinitely original author of charming sensibility, even 




It is difficult not to see the dada movement and Burroughs' later adoption of the 
cut-up as much a political gesture as one of literary exploration - though this was 
certainly an ingredient in Burroughs' extensive use of it throughout novels like 
The Soft Machine, Cities of the Red Night and others. Burroughs describes it in 
1961: 
 
"The cut-up method brings to writers the collage, which has been used by 
painters for fifty years. And used by the moving and , still camera. In fact all 
street shots from movie or still cameras are by the unpredictable factors of 
passersby and juxtaposition cut-ups. And photographers will tell you that often 
their best shots are accidents . . . writers will tell you the same. The best writing 
seems to be done almost by accident [...] 
  
“Take any poet or writer you fancy. Here, say, or poems you have read over 
many times. The words have lost meaning and life through years of repetition. 
Now take the poem and type out selected passages. Fill a page with excerpts. 
Now cut the page. You have a new poem. As many poems as you like."  
(Burroughs, 1961) 
 
The casual abundance of poetry produced this way directly challenges the idea 
that a specially gifted and inspired writer is the essential ingredient in the writing - 
all that is necessary is a heuristic device and some raw materials on which to act. 
The results are often extremely powerful, as any reading from Burroughs' work 
will attest: 
 
"Pan God of Panic piping blue notes through empty streets as the berserk time 
machine twisted a tornado of years and centuries - Wind through dusty offices 
and archives - Board Books scattered to rubbish heaps of the earth - Symbol 
books of the all-powerful board that had controlled thought feeling and movement 
of a planet from birth to death with iron claws of pain and pleasure - The whole 
structure of reality went up in silent explosions - Paper moon and muslin trees 
and in the black silver sky great rents as the cover of the world rained down - 
Biologic film went up.. . "raining dinosaurs" "It sometimes happens. . .just an old 
showman" Death takes over the game so many actors buildings and stars laid 
flat pieces of finance over the golf course summer afternoons bare feet waiting 
for rain smell of sickness in the room Switzerland Panama machine guns in 
Bagdad rising from the typewriter pieces of finance on the evening wind tin 
shares Buenos Aires Mr. Martin smiles old names waiting sad old tune haunted 
the last human attic." (Burroughs, 1961) 
 
The production of literary texts through machinic devices seems to proliferate in 
the middle of the 20th century. Writers like Barthelme, Beckett, Pynchon, 
Vonnegut, Robbe-Grillet, Perec and Calvino all produce texts which can be said 
to have been written with the aid of a heuristic device in the tradition of Roussel 
and Tzara. Often they are consciously political - David Porush in his work on 
cybernetic texts named after Burrough's novel, The Soft Machine, argues that 
such fiction: 
 
"...far from being representative of a class of fiction in its decadence, is the most 
meaningful and hopeful sort of fiction. It cannot as a body be understood without 
constant reference to its source in a highly technologised society. For that very 
reason, however, it has the power to invent a new way of seeing, it offers a new 
language, and along the way it tells a fine, often amusing, often grim story about 
how far along we are." (Porush, 1985) 
 
This odd combination of decadence and Brechtian self-reference and 
estrangement is also reminiscent of the flâneur and the psychogeographic 
movement: Benjamin's flâneur walked, either to revel in decadence, or to 
ambiguate the scopic regimes of the city's imperative to consume. No doubt, as 
in the situationist dérive and later psychogeographic texts and actions, there is 
an important emancipatory element: situationists walked to resist a 'world moving 
away in to representation'. The algorithmic obedience of tracing out a route that 
is arbitrarily pre/pro-scribed, but through the elective and playful devices of our 
own choosing, is actually, (ironically), a way to reassert the agency of the human 
and the individual against a machinic world of capital and convention. 
 
However I'd like to go much further than Porush goes. He argues that one of the 
tropes of cybernetic fiction is that of self-dismantling. This is a deconstructive 
move, and resonates with the late 20th century concerns of continental 
philosophy, which seeks to dislodge the layers of meaning that stratify human 
existence in order to bring to notice the complex shifting network of linguistic and 
textual currents which inform our lives and institutions. However, I'd like to go 
further than seeing cybernetic texts and device-oriented narratives as merely 
deconstructive. 
 
Consider that, even though we accept the premise of the intentional fallacy, we 
still privilege human intentionality as both qualitatively different from and 
somehow better than the nonhuman world of relations. So, even though we 
accept the notion that a text might be a device which can surrender novel 
meanings and effects which the author didn't intentionally encode there, we still 
find it hard to accept that an algorithmically generated text could offer anything of 
equal value: note that we still conventionally attribute the richness of a text, and 
its capacity for renewed interpretation, to the skill of its author - to have written 
something that 'transcends' the finitude of its human creator. 
 
As I've suggested, we have tended to think of automatically produced texts as 
somehow lesser than those originated by acts of human imagination alone. It is 
with this tendency that we also consider the possibility of artificial intelligence as 
a watershed: the achievement of machine consciousness will be equivalent to 
lifting those machines up to some lofty, hard-to-reach transcendental threshold 
which makes them finally equal to humans. I'd prefer to see the problem from the 
other side, and wonder what it is we think is so different about human agency 
that separates us from the rest of the universe. This is not to reduce humans to 
mindlessness; Zizek puts it: 
 
"It is here that the "reductionist" project goes wrong: the problem is not how to 
reduce mind to neuronal "material" processes [...] but, rather, to grasp how mind 
can emerge only through being embedded in the network of social relations and 
material supplements. In other words, the true problem is not "How, if at all, could 
machines IMITATE the human mind?," but, "How does the very identity of human 
mind rely on external mechanical supplements? How does it incorporate 
machines?" (Zizek, 2008) 
 
This is not just deconstruction (in which a philosophy of consciousness gives way 
to a philosophy of linguistics and signification), but a shift towards "placing 
humans and nonhumans on an equal footing". To go further then, we have to re-
equate humans with the menagerie of other things in the world, the nonhuman - 
what object-oriented ontologists have called a flat ontology. 
 
Levi Bryant has outlined a book-project called The Domestication of Humans in 
which he considers the way that plants and microbes have transformed human 
beings: 
 
"The whole point of such a project, of course, is to develop enhanced techniques 
for thinking in terms of flat ontology. When posing questions in the humanities 
our tendency is to think in terms of unilateral determination. We talk about 
humans structuring reality through their perceptions, concepts, and signs, 
treating the process of structuration as proceeding from the human towards a 
sort of gooey chaos that then gets structured by the human. Flat ontology calls 
for bilateral determination, where determination doesn't simply run from human to 
world, but where all sorts of other entities structure humans and societies as 
well." (Bryant, 2010) 
 
Bryant derives this notion of a flat ontology alongside Graham Harman, who in 
turn cites Latour's Irreductions as a breakthrough in terms of escaping the realm 
of the human. Adrift on a sea of other agents and irreducible entities, Harman 
argues that we should start to rethink the bustling nature of the world of objects, 
amongst whom the human object is a mere one among many: 
 
"Even as the philosophy of language and its supposedly reactionary opponents 
both declare victory, the arena of the world is packed with diverse objects, their 
forces unleashed and mostly unloved. Red billiard ball smacks green billiard ball. 
Snowflakes glitter in the light that cruelly annihilates them, while damaged 
submarines rust along the ocean floor. As flour emerges from mills and blocks of 
limestone are compressed by earthquakes, gigantic mushrooms spread in the 
Michigan forest. While human philosophers bludgeon each other over the very 
possibility of "access" to the world, sharks bludgeon tuna fish and icebergs 
smash into coastlines. 
  
"All of these entities roam across the cosmos, inflicting blessings and 
punishments on everything they touch, perishing without a trace or spreading 
their powers further, as if a million animals had broken free from a zoo in some 
Tibetan cosmology." (Harman, 1999) 
 
Andrew Pickering considers the consequences of putting human and nonhuman 
agency on the same footing. His work The Mangle of Practice (1995) looks at the 
way that scientific work proceeds in practice, and argues that far from being the 
logical, deductive unfolding of evidential knowledge, this picture is a retrospective 
portrait imposed on a messy sequence of stumbling events in which human goals 
have strived and struggled with the material agency of machinic experimentation. 
Work of this kind (and I argue that there is a direct parallel here to the way that 
writers write and texts are produced) is the product of a mangling of ideas and 
forces, machines and hunches, objects and products. This is a dance of agency 
between the human and nonhuman, in which such apparently crucial phenomena 
as human intentionality emerge from the interplay of possibilities and events, 
"brought to heel by the cultures in which they are situated": 
 
"Scientists do not simply fix their goals once and for all and stick to them, come 
what may. In the struggles with material agency that I call tuning, plans and goals 
are at stake and liable to revision. And thus the intentional character of human 
agency has a further aspect of temporal emergence, being reconfigured itself in 
the real time of practice, as well as a further aspect of intertwining with material 
agency, being reciprocally redefined with the contours of material agency in 
tuning." (Pickering, 1995) 
 
So I want to conclude by suggesting that I was right to feel that my machines are 
trying to have their own way. Me and my machines are, to use Pickering's terms, 
tuning each other to our own 'agenda'. We are both devices which perform 
machinic captures of input material and transform them into artefacts which, in 
Tzara's phrase, resemble ourselves. So the computers, circuits, dice, algorithms, 
typewriters, pens - and even the words themselves - are cybernetic machines 
with which we are forced into collaboration and partnership, rather than mastery. 
 
Italo Calvino confirms this from his own experience of writing: 
 
"Literature as I knew it was a constant series of attempts to make one word stay 
put after another by following certain definite rules; or more often, rules that were 
neither definite nor definable, but that might be extracted from a series of 
examples, or rules made up for the occasion - that is to say, derived from the 
rules followed by other writers. [...] The "I" of the author is dissolved in the writing. 
[...] Writers, as they have always been up to now, are already writing machines; 
or at least they are when things are going well. [...] And so the author vanishes - 
that spoiled child of ignorance - to give place to a more thoughtful person, a 
person who will know that the author is a machine, and will know how this 
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